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Abstract 
 
This paper utilizes the Korea Innovation Survey data to find out the 
determinants of industry-university and industry-GRI (IUG) cooperation and its 
impact on firm performance. We find first that among determinants of IUG 
cooperation, traditional firm characteristics variables of sizes and R&D intensity 
are not significant at all, while the participation at the national R&D project turns 
out be most significant and robust in both cooperation modes. This is in quite 
contrast to the results from the cases of European countries, and reflects 
importantly the heavy weight of government policies in promoting the IUG 
cooperation in late-comer economies. Second, regarding the impacts of the IUG 
cooperation, we strikingly find no significant impact on the innovation 
probability of firms when we control the possible endogeneity such that already 
innovative firms might participate more at such cooperation modes. This implies 
that the IUG cooperation cannot guarantee a firm success in technological 
innovation; rather, it may have an influence on the selection or direction of the 
firm’s research projects. When we limit the analysis to the innovative firms, we 
do find positive impacts of the IUG cooperation on patents generated from new 
product innovation but no impacts in terms of sales increase or labor productivity. 
These results seem to reflect the still transitional nature of the NIS and 
knowledge industrialization.  
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I. Introduction 
 
In the knowledge-based economy, knowledge is essential; thus the role of university 
as a source of new knowledge has even become more important than in the past 
(Etzkowitz et al., 2000). Fast-paced global competition and technological change also add 
significance to the firm’s links to university for not only discovery of knowledge but 
also its industrialization (Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1997; Hwang et 
al., 2003). In other words, the universities and public research institutes have emerged as 
the key component of the national innovation system (NIS) which was proposed by 
Freeman (1987) and Lundvall (1992). 
Freeman defines the NIS as a “network of institutions in the public and private 
sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new 
technologies.” Lundvall defines it as the “elements and relationships which interact in 
the production, diffusion, and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge… and 
are either located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state.” He broadens the 
concept of Freeman to include economic structure and institutional set-up that affect 
searching, learning, and adapting. In a book comparing the NIS of 15 countries, Nelson 
(1993) points out that the performance differences among countries reflect different 
institutional arrangements. In the NIS literature, one of the roles of universities and 
research institutes is to channel their knowledge to firms, and universities function as a 
knowledge diffuser by producing quality students and by interacting with firms through 
cooperative programs. 
Specifically regarding the role of university, there exist two contrasting views, 
Triple Helix Thesis and the New Economics of Science. Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
(1997) introduce a triple-helix model of industry-university-government relations, 
emphasizing both social and economic roles of university. Here, the interactions among 
three are keys to facilitating conditions for innovation. The Triple-Helix thesis argues 
that university needs to be directly linked to industry in order to maximize the 
industrialization of knowledge. This emphasizes on the “third mission” of the university 
to economic development, as well as teaching and research (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 
2000). On the other hand, the New Economics of Science (Dasgupta and David, 1994) 
emphasizes the education as an innate function of university. This view is concerned 
about the relationships between university and industry becoming too close, arguing that 
they may be detrimental to the scientific potentials of a nation, and that a proper 
division of labor between these institutional actors is needed. Criticizing the 
inappropriateness of the two in its applications to developing countries, Eun et al (2006) 
suggest a “contingent or contest-specific” perspective on industry-university 
relationships. Each country has its own NIS, and it is natural that the industry-university 
linkages of each country take various forms, assuming different functions in a nation. 
This paper takes the case of Korea to investigate the role of universities and government 
research institutes (GRIs) in the NIS of a late-comer and fast catching-up economy, with 
focus on the determinants of the university-academy linkages and their impacts on firm 
performance. 
One of the most important characteristics of the Korean NIS has been the “twin 
dominance” by the big business and the government, which also meant a relatively 
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weak role by the universities and the SMEs (Kim, 1993; Lim, 2006; Choi et al., 2007). For 
instance, universities employ around 70 per cent of all doctorates in Korea, yet 
paradoxically conduct only 10 per cent of Korean research (OECD, 2008). Also, as of 
2005, 39.7% of researchers and 52.2% of Ph.D. researchers belong to the top 20 firms 
(MOST, 2007). While big business groups have dominated the NIS of Korea by huge 
size of their in-house R&D since the mid 1980, it was the government and GRIs that 
have led initially the NIS of Korea during its early take-off period in the 1960s and 
1970s. In the 1970s, Korea was in transition from light to heavy and chemical industries, 
but its national R&D base was weak. So, the Korean government tried to promote 
national R&D capacity by establishing GRIs: a number of GRIs were established, based 
on the Special Research Institute Promotion Law of 1973, in the fields of machinery, 
shipbuilding, chemical engineering, marine science, and electronics.  
Noticeably, from the mid-1970s, chaebol firms started to grow rapidly with 
diversification or entries into heavy and chemical industries. Here, the government 
played a significant role by selecting to provide a few chaebol firms with exclusive 
advantages. Even in the 1980s and 1990, big business groups or Chaebols were helped 
by the government-led public-private research consortia in achieving key R&D goals, 
with such examples of TDX (a system of telephone switches), memory chips 
development and digital TV projects (Lee and Lim, 2001; Lee et al., 2005). According to 
the OECD’s study (2003), Korea is the only country that GRI, rather than university, had 
a relatively greater role in national R&D. 
In the context of the above discussion, one of the possible contribution of this study 
is that we are examining the role of the government policy in promoting firms’ 
collaboration with universities and GRIs, whereas the existing studies tend to focus 
more on firm-level and sectoral level characteristics, such as R&D intensity, firm size 
(Santoro and Chakrabarti. 2002), science-basedness (Meyer-Krahmer and Ulrich Schmoch, 
1998) and IPR regimes (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). Also, as GRIs have been the key 
participants in these national R&D projects that involved private firms, it is important to 
examine the impact of firms’ collaboration with GRIs on firm performance. This is one 
of the distinctive features of this study. 
In contrast to the GRIs, the universities have played minor role in boosting R&D 
performance of the private sector in Korea. Big private firms relied more on foreign 
knowledge sources than local sources and universities as they hired quality scientists 
and engineers from abroad or acquiring technology in collaboration with foreign 
partners. Kim (1993) argues that the lack of interaction between university and industry 
is one of the greatest weaknesses of Korea's national system, and it was due to the 
nature of Korean universities as a teaching-oriented university. It is since the 1990s that 
research has been given increasing priority in universities in Korea. Thus, since the 
1990s, the ranking of Korea has been rising in terms of the number of Science Citation 
Index (SCI) papers to which university has contributed significantly: Korea ranked 19th 
in 1996 with university accounting for 83.0% of the contributions (Lee, 1998). Then 
from the late 1990s on ward, policy agenda has finally shifted toward entrepreneurial 
role of universities.  
The enactment of the Technology transfer Promotion Law in 2001 symbolizes this 
transition of interests toward knowledge industrialization. This Law prescribes that 
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public universities should establish units or institutions, such as TLOs (Technology 
Licensing Offices), that are in charge of technology transfer and training of specialists. 
Promotion of the industry-university cooperation got more momentum as universities 
started to establish the so-called “industry-university cooperation foundation” from 
2004 after the enactment of the Law on Industrial Education and Industry-University 
Cooperation in 2003. Only with this law, the intellectual property rights of research 
outcomes of university professors began to belong formally to universities, whereas in 
the past individual professors tended to file patents to have them as their personal 
ownership. As of 2007, 134 universities have established industry-university 
cooperation foundations within their campuses, out of which 59.8% (80 universities) 
have had TLOs. The number of TLOs increased rapidly, especially, in 2004 with 43 
being newly established, whereas there was only 32 until 2003 (KRF, 2007). The above 
discussion indicates that the knowledge industrialization from universities is recent 
phenomenon and it has not been much progressed. Thus, it is interesting to examine its 
impact on firm performance and compare the results with those from advanced or 
mature countries with longer history of the collaboration. Specifically, we find with the 
data of 2000/01 period that the collaboration with universities is not significantly 
increasing the probability of innovation success, and has not lead to sales increases but 
only in the increase of patents, which is in contrast to the results in Europe by Belderbos 
et al. (2004) or Faems et al. (2005). 
While this paper addresses the questions what determines the IUG (industry-
university/GRIs) linkages and how the linkages affect firm performances, it also achieves 
some methodological improvement. Some studies, for instance Monjon and Waelbroeck 
(2003), examining the impact on firm performance do not control possible endogeneity 
such that better performing firms might be more inclined to pursue collaboration with 
universities. We take a two-step approach. We first estimate the determinants of IUG 
cooperation by Probit model regressions. Second, it estimates the impact of this 
cooperation on innovation performance where a possible endogeneity of IUG 
cooperation measure is controlled by using the results of the first-step estimations. We 
consider the controlling endogeneity is important, because we have obtained 
contradictory results; when endogeneity is controlled, collaboration with universities is 
not shown to be significantly increasing the probability of innovation. 
Also, when we examine the impact of the IUG cooperation on firms’ performance, 
we control a possible sample selection bias using Heckman’s 2SLS method, and the 
types of innovation are differentiated into product vs. process innovation. The empirical 
analysis utilizes the data from the 2002 Korean Innovation Survey (KIS) that was 
conducted by Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI). The KIS comprises of 
firm-level data on technological innovation in the manufacturing sector. In order to 
allow for use of more variables and data credibility, the Survey data is merged with the 
standard financial statements of the firms compiled by a credit rating agency.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the existing literature on the 
determinants of IUG cooperation and on the impacts of this cooperation on firm 
performance, extracting four hypotheses. Section III explains data, variables and 
methodologies to be used for the empirical analysis. Section V discusses the empirical 
results with interpretations, and Section VI provides summary and conclusions remarks. 
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II. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
 
1. What determines the Industry’s Relations with University/GRIs: Hypothesis 1 
 
As determinants of firms’ relations with universities or GRIs, we can in general 
consider the firm-level and sector level characteristics, as well as the impact of some 
government policy initiatives.  
The Resource-based theory of the firms states that internal resources play an 
important role in a firm’s growth propensity (Penrose, 1959; Richardson, 1972). If the 
internal resources are binding, then it makes sense for a firm to engage in cooperation 
with external partners to get access to additional resources, such as capital, technology, 
and human capital. Industry-university cooperation has been discussed as one type of 
R&D cooperation in these contexts. According to Geisler (1995), the more recognized 
the fact that they are interdependent in terms of resources, the higher the possibility that 
university and firm establish partnerships. On the other hand, as Santoro (2000) and 
Freel and Harrison (2006) argue that, in spite of their importance in research, firm often 
looks for other partners not university in pursuing technological initiatives, due to the 
mismatch of research interests between them.  
Firm size is one of the most obvious variables to represent the size of firm-level 
resources, which affect firm’s decision about R&D cooperation with external actors. 
Large firms can cooperate with partners more effectively than small firms, thereby 
benefiting from their internal resources (Tether, 2002). On the contrary, there exist a 
number of studies that argue otherwise: small firms tend to be more eager for external 
cooperation than large firms as they face lack of internal resources, especially financial, 
R&D capacity or facility. In empirical analyses, like the theories, the impact of firm size 
on the firm’s decision in cooperation with university or GRI is obscure. We will check 
this with the Korean data. 
As a firm-level variable, we will also consider R&D intensity, as it matters as one 
possible proxy for the absorptive capacity of a firm that maximizes benefits from R&D 
cooperation (Fontana et al., 2006). Firms, whose R&D capacities are large enough to 
easily absorb external knowledge, are willing to obtain benefits from it. However, the 
opposite can occur: these firms may substitute external cooperation by developing 
technology independently (Love and Roper, 1999). In this case, the smaller the R&D 
capacity, the more pursuant the firm is to cooperate with partners. Like the empirical 
analyses for firm size, those for the impact of R&D intensity show obscure results. 
There are also many researches noting the importance of sectoral characteristics in 
the industry-university cooperation. Pavitt (1984) argues that learning from 
advancements in technology is crucial for science-based industries, e.g. electronics and 
chemicals, for which industry-university should be more important. Some literature 
(Meyer-Krahmer and Ulrich Schmoch, 1998; Santoro and Chakrabati, 2002; Schartinger et al., 
2002) underlines the importance of this cooperation, saying that these industries heavily 
depend on progress in sciences and technology. 
Sector characteristics are emphasized in the literature on sectoral systems of 
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innovations (SSI). Marlerba (2005) defines the SSI as a “set of agents carrying out 
market and non-market interactions for the creation and sale of sectoral products.” He 
suggests the following four theoretical blocks of the SSI: 1) regimes of knowledge and 
technology; 2) demand conditions (or marker regimes); 3) actors and networks, and the 
coordination among them; and 4) surrounding institutions including IPRs, laws, culture, 
and so on. Literature states that the specific patterns of innovation activities are 
determined by technological regimes. Breschi et al. (2000) define a technological regime 
as the combination of technological opportunities, appropriability of innovations, 
cumulativeness of technical advancements, and properties of the knowledge base. Park 
and Lee (2006) analyze the relationship between technological regime and technological 
catch-up using U.S. patent data and find that catching-up countries tend to record higher 
performance in classes/sectors with a shorter cycle time, easier access to knowledge, 
and higher appropriability. 
The Industrial organization literature is interested in how the imperfect 
appropriability of innovation outcomes affects the incentives for a firm’s innovation: 
appropriability increases benefits from R&D cooperation when incoming spillovers are 
high enough, which is on the contrary when there are inducements for a free-rider. 
There is an argument, like Veugelers and Cassiman, saying that due to the generic 
characteristics of knowledge, industry-university cooperation tends to be less involved 
in this issue compared to industry-competitor or supplier cooperation. In this regards, 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) empirically verify that the effective IPR regime 
facilitates the firm’s propensity of cooperating with universities, while its strategic 
protection, such as secrecy or lead time, does not. We will consider each sector’s IPR 
regime as one of the sectoral characteristics that affect the industry-university/GRIs 
relations. 
Finally, the government’s policy for R&D is also emphasized as being crucial for 
technology transfer from public research organizations to industry. The Bayh-Dole Act 
of the US in the 1980s is often cited as the legislation for facilitating the growth in 
university patenting; the Act allowed the IPR of university research results conducted by 
public funds to belong to universities. Since then, a number of OECD countries have 
emulated to adopt similar laws in order to utilize academic research for commercial 
advantages (OECD, 2003). Government’s supports for R&D are helpful for firms that 
need external partnerships but face financial or networking problems. The government 
may provide those firms with capitals for acquiring basic or core technology from 
university or GRI or with opportunities for collaborating on research projects with them 
(Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003). Both Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) and Capron and Cinccera 
(2003) prove that firms, which use the government’s support measures, tend to 
cooperate with these public research organizations. 
 
2. The Impacts of the Linkages on Firm Performance 
 
(1) Innovation Probability: Hypothesis 2 
 
Knowledge is different from technology in terms of “purpose, degree of codification, 
type of storage and degree of observability” (Landry et al., 2007): the former is tacit 
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stored in people’s head, intangible with the imprecise impact of its use, and concretizing 
theories and principles; the latter is codified in software or blueprint, tangible with the 
precise impact of its use, and changing technological environments. Namely, technology 
transfer is considered as the limited activities of knowledge transfer. 
Unlike the technology from private firms, a large part of the knowledge from 
university is transferred to firms informally,1 although previous studies have focused 
mainly on citations (Spencer 2001), patents (Hall and Ziedonis), and spin-offs (Link and 
Scott, 2005). This is particularly the case in Korea in which education or consulting is 
more prevalent than others. So, due to their characteristics of knowledge or way of 
knowledge transfer, industry-university cooperation may not directly influence the 
firms’ success in innovation; rather, it can affect their decision or management of 
research projects (George et al., 2002; Mowery and Sampat, 2005). Actually, many studies 
that have tried to conceptualize knowledge transfer from university emphasize its 
activities of affecting decision-making processes rather than generating tangible 
products (Knott and Wildasky, 1980; Lester and Wilds, 1990). 
The impact of industry-university cooperation is empirically obscure. Based on a 
CIS data of 1,460 French firms, Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003) find that cooperation 
with university (foreign rather than domestic) increases the probability of radical 
innovation, while spillover from university does not.23 On the other hand, Sung (2005)’s 
study in Korea finds that this cooperation does not affect the innovation probability of 
Korean firms in general. We will check, using a more rigorous techniques checking the 
possible endogeneity, whether the cooperation with universities or GRIs tend to increase 
firms’ innovation probabilities or not. 
 
(2) Tangible Outcomes of Innovation: Sale increase vs. Patents: Hypothesis 3   
  
University’s research and development is characterized as being new or creative. 
Previous literature underlines the fact that industry-university cooperation contributes to 
radical innovation, which is new not only to the ‘firm’ but also to the ‘market’ (Monjon 
and Waelbroeck, 2003) or to the creation of ‘new competencies’ (Faems et al., 2005). On 
the contrary, industry-industry cooperation contributes to incremental innovation, which 
is new to the ‘firm’ or to the improvement of ‘existing competencies.’ This implies that 
the former has a higher possibility of leading to more patents or generating new 
products. 
This is supported by Belderbos et al.’s study (2004) that is based on the Dutch CIS I 
and II of 2,056 firms. They empirically prove that both formal cooperation and spillover 
from university facilitate the growth in innovative sales, concluding that university is 
important source of knowledge for radical innovation.4 Using the Belgian CIS II of 221 
firms, Faems et al. (2005) examine two types of technological cooperation: the 
“explorative” partnerships with university and GRI and the “exploitative” partnerships 
with client and supplier. They find that the presence and number of “explorative” 
partnerships improve the proportion of turnover generated by product innovation, while 
that of “exploitative” partnerships enhance product-improving innovation. George et 
al.’s study (2002), using a data of 2,457 alliances by 147 U.S. publicly traded 
biotechnology companies, reveal the significant impact of industry-university 
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cooperation on patents. Considering the quality as well as quantity of university 
linkages, e.g. the number of Research-I university linkages or total federal R&D 
funding, they claim that firms with links to university perform better in terms of the 
number of patents as well as products in the market. In contrast to the results on patents 
or sales, most studies report that university-industry cooperation has no significant 
impact on labor productivity (Belderbos et al., 2004; Monjon and Waelbroeck, 2003). The 
interpretation seems to be that labor productivity is affected many other factors.  
These studies are from the context of the advanced countries where knowledge 
industrialization systems have been well developed, and thus industry-university 
cooperation has been found to be directly linked to the increases in sale from new 
innovative products. However, the industry-university cooperation has been just being 
developed in Korea and the forms of knowledge industrialization are not diverse and 
active. This implies a possibility that the impact of this cooperation is not fully revealed 
as sales as much as it is in advanced countries; rather, it could be shown more as patents, 
because patents have a merit of being filed within a short time, regardless of the 
development of knowledge industrialization systems.  
On the basis of the above discussions, we hypothesize that for Korean innovative 
firms the impact of IUG cooperation is revealed in the form of patents rather than 
increases in sales or labor productivity.  
 
(3) Product innovation vs. Process Innovation: Hypothesis 4 
 
University is the institution that functions higher education with basic or long-term 
research interests, which is different from firms with practical or short-term market 
needs (Hoffman et al., 1998). This implies that industry-university cooperation may be 
helpful for product innovation, while industry-industry cooperation may for process 
innovation. Rouvinen (2002) supports this through an empirical analysis of CIS data 
from Finnish manufacturing firms: that is, industry-university or non-profit research 
organization contributes only to product innovation, while industry-client or supplier 
contributes to process innovation as well. He explains it such that process innovation 
benefits from the “stocks of capital-embodied technology,” while product innovation 
does from the “disembodied forms of technology.” He also mentions the point that 
process innovation may constitute a part of product innovation rather than being 
patented. 
On the other hand, there exists the opposite argument: Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
(2000) state that science has been organized in pursuit of practical as well as theoretical 
interests. Freel and Harrison (2006) empirically prove the positive relationship between 
product innovation and industry-customer or GRI cooperation, and between process 
innovation and industry-supplier or university cooperation. They argue that, in spite of 
their influences on product innovation, universities are significant contributors to just 
the sort of “industry-relevant” research for manufacturing firms at least. 
A few papers point out that the IUG cooperation in Korea focuses on process rather 
than product innovation. For instance, Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI, 
2006) reports that a large number of Korean firms participate in national R&D programs, 
focusing on problem-solving rather than new product or technology development. In the 
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case studies of the IUG cooperation system of Po-hang Steel, an affiliate of POSCO, 
Park et al. (2000) find that this system focuses on problem solving, is centered on short-
term projects, and mostly contributes to process and product improvement but partly to 
product innovation. We will investigate the possibly different impacts of the IUG 
cooperation on the product vs. process innovation with the Korean data.  
 
 
 
III. Data, Variables, and Methodologies 
  
1. Data 
 
The 2002 KIS (Korea Innovation Survey) is the third innovation survey conducted in 
Korea. The KIS, following the definitions in the Oslo Manual5 from the OECD, covers 
the innovation-related activities of firms for 2000-2001. Out of the 6,233 target firms, 
60.6% or 3,776 firms have responded. After matching with the database providing the 
standard financial statement (the Korean Investor Service VALUE database which is most 
widely used in academic research), a total of 538 firms are found to have their matching 
financial statement data available and thus only these firms are used for econometric 
analysis. Technological innovation here includes three types – new product innovation, 
product-improving innovation and process innovation: the first two is called as product 
innovation. 
The composition of the sample firms used in analysis below is as follows ( Figure 
A1 ). Out of the total 538 firms, 388 (72.1%) are innovative firms, while 150 (27.9%) 
are non-innovative firms. The innovative firms are divided into three, with overlapping 
among them, namely, 269 (50%), 324 (60.2%) and 250 (46.5%) firms that succeeded in 
product innovation, product-improving innovation and process innovation, respectively. 
Specifically, the innovative firms are defined as those who conduct technological 
innovations (one of the three types) during 2000-2001 and produce at least one of 
innovative outcomes in 2001. And, they are asked how many patents they file from each 
type of innovation, and what percentage of their sales is related to the product 
innovation. 
Regarding the cooperation with outsiders, the survey asks firms the following 
question, “Does your firm cooperate with partners for technological innovation? If yes, 
how important is the cooperation (with each partner) for your innovation (on a five-point 
scale)?” Out of the total 538 firms, 40.1% or 216 firms had a positive answer regarding 
cooperation with at least one partner. According to the type of partner, university, and 
GRI ranks fourth (139, 25.8%) and fifth (129, 24.0%), respectively, in terms of number 
and percentage, and both rank third (3.32 point) in terms of the degree of importance 
(Table 1). These figures are a bit lower than those of client firms (161, 29.9% / 3.66 point) 
and suppliers (161, 29.9% / 3.32 point). 
For empirical analysis below, we focus on those firms that answered doing the 
‘technological cooperation’ with either university or GRIs. 
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<Table 1> Technological cooperation by types of partners (n=538) 
Partners No. of firms (%) Degree of importance 1) 
(point) 
Affiliated firms 113 (21.0) 3.42 
Clients 161 (29.9) 3.66 
Suppliers (raw materials) 161 (29.9) 3.32 
Suppliers (components/SW) 142 (26.4) 3.03 
Competitors 122 (22.7) 2.88 
Joint venture 94 (17.5) 2.84 
Business service firms 101 (18.8) 2.74 
Universities 139 (25.8) 3.32 
Public research institutes 129 (24.0) 3.32 
Public research laboratories 2) 116 (21.6) 3.06 
Research associations 99 (18.4) 2.45 
Research cooperatives 92 (17.1) 1.00 
Private research institutes 95 (17.7) 2.53 
           Note: 1) The average value of the firms that cooperate with corresponding partners.  
                2) Public research laboratories conduct testing and certification service, which is far from research. 
Accordingly, this study considers only public research institutes as the variable of GRIs for 
empirical analysis.   
 
 
2. Variables 
 
(1) Firm Characteristics 
 
Firm size: In this study, firm size (SIZE) is measured as a log value of the average 
number of employees during 2000~2001. The survey results show that the mean firm 
size is larger for firms that cooperate with university and GRI (5.27 and 5.30), 
respectively, rather than otherwise (5.02 and 5.01). The t-ratio is 2.23 (p=0.03) for 
university and 2.56 (p=0.01) for GRI, implying the significant difference in firm size 
between cooperators and non-cooperators (<Table 2>). Therefore, based on the above 
discussions, we will test if firm size affects the firm’s propensity of cooperating with 
them. 
 
R&D intensity: In this study, R&D intensity (RD_INT) is measured as a ratio of 
average R&D expenditure during 2000~2001 to sales in 2001. The mean of R&D 
intensity is only slightly higher for firms in cooperation with university (5.47%) and 
GRI (5.94%), respectively, than otherwise (2.99% and 2.91%). The difference is not 
significant as seen from the t-ratios of each (1.12 (p=0.26) and 1.28 (p=0.20)) (<Table 2>).  
Using regression analysis, we will test if R&D intensity affects the firm’s propensity of 
cooperating with them. 
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Reasons for Cooperation: Firms cooperate with others for a variety of reasons, and 
sharing of costs or risk would be one of the reasons. This makes sense because R&D 
projects often involve high costs and uncertainty (Jensen and Thursby, 2003). In the 
empirical analyses, both Belderbos et al. (2004) and Veugelers et al. (2005) reveal that 
the cost-sharing objective is one of the key factor affecting firm’s decision in 
cooperating with university. However, regarding the risk-sharing objective, they obtain 
a negative correlation. In this study, the cost-sharing objective (COST) and risk-sharing 
objective (RISK) are measured based on the answers to the following question: “What is 
the weight of the following as a barrier to technological innovation (on a five-point 
scale)?” Among 23 hindrance factors to innovation, the weight of excessive risk or 
uncertainty is used for the RISK variable and that of excessively high cost for 
innovation or industrialization, for the COST variable. The reasoning is that those firms 
that felt such barriers would have a higher motivation to seek collaboration with 
universities or GRIs. 
Actually, the mean score of these two cooperation objectives is much higher for 
firms that are engaged in this cooperation than otherwise (<Table 2>): university (3.14 vs. 
2.08) and GRI (3.22 vs. 2.09) for cost-sharing objectives, and university (3.17 vs. 2.20) 
and GRI (3.26 vs. 2.19) for risk-sharing objectives. The t-ratio is statistically significant 
for the both objectives. Therefore, we hypothesize that the more important are these 
cooperation objectives, the higher the firm’s propensity to cooperate with universities or 
GRIs. 
 
Affiliation to Business Groups: Business groups refer to a collection of legally 
independent firms bound together by equity ties. Given the predominance of such styles 
of firms in developing countries, the literature attributes the origin of business groups to 
underdeveloped market institutions and high transaction costs in developing countries 
(Leff, 1978; Goto, 1982). There exists a large volume of empirical research finding 
several advantages of business groups, associated with internal capital and products 
markets as well as resource sharing among affiliates (Chang and Hong, 2000). On the one 
hand, if an affiliate can obtain technology from other sister affiliates within the same 
group, it would feel less need for cooperating with universities or GRIs. On the other 
hand, it may take advantage of the brand names, resources, and networks of the 
affiliated group, thus making IUG cooperation arrangement easier and effective than 
otherwise (Tether, 2002). Belderbos et al. (2004) empirically prove that firms belonging 
to a group tend to cooperate with university. On the other hand, Mohnen and Hoareau 
(2003) reveal the opposite result, that is, the negative impact of this affiliation, 
interpreting it such that affiliates cooperate with university only through their 
headquarters while headquarters do directly. Given the importance of the business 
groups in Korean economic growth, it is important to examine their role in IUG. 
In this study, affiliation to business groups (GROUP) is measured in two ways. One 
is based on the answer to the following question in the survey: “Of which type is your 
firm among an independent company, an affiliate to domestic business groups, or an 
affiliates to foreign firms?” GROUP is measured as a dummy, 1 if it is either a domestic 
or a foreign affiliate, or 0 otherwise. The mean percentage of firms affiliated to business 
groups is lower for firms that cooperate with university or GRI (11.51 and 10.08), 
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compared to the ratio among the non-cooperators (13.79 and 14.18). However, the t-ratio 
of each is -0.68 (p=0.50) and -1.29 (p=0.20), and the difference is not statistically 
significant (<Table 2>). The other measurement is chaebol. CHAEBOL10 and 
CHAEBOL11-30 refer to the top 10 and the top 11th to 30th business groups as 
designated by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) of the Korean government. The mean 
percentage of firms affiliated to top 10 or below Chaebols is almost similar for firms 
that cooperate with university or GRI as the ratio among the non-cooperators, and the 
difference between cooperators and non-cooperators is not statistically significant. 
Anyway, we will add these variables to test if affiliation to groups or chaebol decreases 
the firm’s propensity to cooperate with universities or GRIs.   
 
Firm Location: In spite of developments in communication means and reduced 
transaction costs in general, the factor of firm location or geographic proximity is still 
an issue in industry-university cooperation. It is expected that the firms in the same 
region as universities can have easy access to technology or employ quality scientists 
from the universities. Audretsch and Stephan (1996) emphasize the geographic 
proximity in terms of specific roles played by scientists, e.g. technology transfers. This 
is particularly important if knowledge is tacit, such that its transfer can be facilitated by 
face-to-face communication. Jaffe (1986) suggests that the closer the proximity of 
university research to corporate laboratories, the more probable the potency of 
spillovers from university. Acs et al. (1994) also argue that firms receive R&D 
spillovers from the knowledge of university or large counterpart. Mowery and Ziedonis 
(2001) underline “regional agglomeration effects” – geographical proximity between 
firms and public research institutes - in the growth of high-technology clusters in the 
U.S. 
Due to data limitation, we use region dummies, instead of direct measure of 
geographic proximity, to reflect firm location. The KIS Survey data allow sixteen 
regions across South Korea, and this analysis re-groups them into seven dummies. Firm 
locations are thereby measured as dummies with value of 1 if a firm is located in a 
specific region and 0 otherwise. It is found that 56.5% of all firms are located in the 
Seoul Metropolitan area, followed by South Kyungsang province (16.7%), North 
Kyungsang province (9.5%), South Choongchung province (5.8%), North Choongchung 
province (4.8%), and so on. Based on the above, we will test if firm location affects the 
firm’s propensity of cooperating with them 
 
(2) Sector Characteristics  
 
As noted by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), the nature of IPR regime affect the 
firm’s propensity of cooperate universities. We take the IPR regime as a sector variable 
in our regression. In our study, the IPR regime variable (IN_IPR) is measured based on 
the answers to the following question in the survey: “How important are the following 
methods as means to protect IPRs of your innovation outcomes (on a five-point scale)?” 
Among four answered methods, patent is used for this variable. IN_IPR is measured as 
the industry average, following the idea of Veugelers and Cassiman (2005). In the case 
of Korea, the mean score of the IPR regime is higher for firms that cooperate with 
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universities (2.09) than otherwise (1.99), with a t-ratio of 3.01 (p=0.0) (<Table 2>). This 
implies that firms cooperating with universities tend to use patent filing to protect their 
innovation outcomes than other means of protection. However, the mean score is only 
slightly higher for cooperators with GRIs (2.07) than non-cooperators (2.00), and the 
difference is not statistically significant as evident in the t-ratio of 2.16 (p=0.03). We will 
find out by regressions whether the IPR regime matters for the firm’s propensity of IUG 
cooperation will be done. 
 
(3) Government’s Policy Initiatives 
 
Government’s support: The variable representing the government’s support (G_SUP) 
is constructed based on the answers to the following question in the survey: “Which 
government’s support measure does your firm use/participate?” Among the possible 
answers, whether a firm participates with national R&D projects or not is used for this 
variable. This variable take the value of 1 if a firm participates at the national R&D 
projects, and 0 otherwise. If a firm participates at the national R&D programs, a firm is 
entitled to get grant for R&D expenditure in Korea, and some of them are conducted in 
joint projects with universities and/or GRIs. For example, in 2005, out of the total 
national R&D projects (25,877) with the budget of 6,339 trillion won, joint research 
projects, conducted through industry-university or industry-GRI cooperation, accounted 
for 61.2% (15,829) in numbers or 58.9% (3,737 trillion won) of total budget (NSTC, 2006). 
In terms of the type of cooperation, the tripartite cooperation involving industry, 
university, and GRIs was the majority, accounting for 1,069 trillion won of the R&D 
expenditure. It was followed by bilateral types of either industry-university (748 trillion 
won) or industry-GRI cooperation (452 trillion won). In these projects, the number of 
patents generated out of these projects is counted as one of the evaluation criteria. 
Thus, the participation at the national projects means higher likelihood of firms’ 
cooperative arrangement with universities and/or GRIs. As seen from <Table 2>, the 
mean percentage of firms that use government support is higher among firms that 
cooperate with universities and GRIs (66.17 and 73.13), respectively, rather than 
otherwise (30.53 and 29.67). The t-ratio of each is 7.95 (p=0.00) and 9.43 (p=0.00), and 
thus, the difference is statistically significant. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
government’s supports for R&D facilitate the firm’s propensity of IUG cooperation. 
<Table 2> Statistics on the possible determinants of IUG cooperation 
  Industry-university cooperation Industry-GRI cooperation 
  Cooperation Non-cooperation Cooperation 
Non-
cooperation 
  (n=139) (n=399) 
t-test 
  
(n=129) (n=409) 
t-test 
  
Firm size (log of employees) 5.27 5.02 2.23 (0.03)** 5.3 5.01 
2.56 
(0.01)** 
R&D intensity (%) 5.47 2.99 1.12 (0.26) 5.94 2.91 
1.28 
(0.20) 
% of firms belonging to business 
groups  11.51 13.78 
-0.68 
(0.50) 10.08 14.18 
-1.29 
(0.20) 
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% of firms belonging to the top 10 
business groups 4.32 2.06 
1.09 
(0.28) 3.88 2.44  
0.99 
(0.45) 
% of firms belonging to the top  
11-30 business groups 1.44 3.26 
-1.35 
(0.18) 1.55 3.18 
-1.17 
(0.24) 
Cost-sharing objective (point) 3.14 2.08 8.58 (0.00)*** 3.22 2.09 
9.27 
(0.00)*** 
Risk-sharing objective (point) 3.17 2.2 7.72 (0.00)*** 3.26 2.19 
8.66 
(0.00)*** 
% of firms participating in national 
R&D projects 66.17 30.53 
7.95 
(0.00)*** 73.13 29.67 
9.43 
(0.00)*** 
IPR regime (point) 2.09 1.99 3.01 (0.00)*** 2.07 2 
2.16 
(0.03)** 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis present p-value.  
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 
(4) Measuring innovation probability 
 
In this study, innovation probability is measured as 1 if a firm does technological 
innovation and 0 otherwise. In Korea, 25.8% or 139 out of a total of 538 firms 
cooperate with university, of which 94.2% or 131 firms do technological innovation 
(Table 3). However, 64.4% or 260 out of 399 firms, which have no cooperation with it, 
do technological innovation. With regard to the industry-GRI cooperation, a 24.0% or 
129 firms out of the total have cooperation with GRIs, and among them 95.4% or 123 
firms do technological innovation. However, 64.8% or 268 of 409 firms, which have no 
cooperation with them, do technological innovation.  
On the basis of the above discussions, the second hypothesis of this paper is that 
IUG cooperation may not directly increase the innovation probability of Korean firms. 
 
<Table 3> IUG cooperation and technological innovation 
(unit: no. of firms) 
Universities GRIs  
Cooperators 
(n=139) 
Non-
cooperators 
(n=399) 
t-statistics Cooperators 
(n=129) 
Non-
cooperators 
(n=409) 
t-statistics 
No. (%) of 
innovative firms 
131 
(94.24%) 
260 
(64.41%) 
9.58 
(0.00)*** 
123 
(95.35%) 
268 
(64.79%) 
10.15 
(0.00)*** 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis present p-value.  
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 
(5) Variables of Innovation outcomes: Sales, Patents, and labor productivity    
  
In this study, innovation performance is measured in three ways: 1) the number of 
patents filed from the three finds of innovation together as well as from each type of 
innovation, 2) share of sales revenue associated with product innovation, and 3) labor 
productivity. The first two variables are from the innovation survey, while the last one is 
from the financial statement of the firm database.  
In terms of the average number of patents filed from technological innovation, 
overall, it is higher for cooperators (7.22) than non-cooperators (5.31) with universities, 
but the difference is not significant (Table 4A). In the case of industry-GRI cooperation, 
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cooperating firms have produced on average 10.36 patents from their innovations more 
than non-cooperators have produced, 3.91, but the differences are not statistically 
significant either. As to the means of percentage in the sales of innovation outcomes and 
labor productivity, no significant differences are found between cooperators and non-
cooperators.  
 
According to <Figure A1>, more Korean firms are engaged in product (342) rather 
than process innovation (239). Looking at the former in detail, more firms do product 
improvement (303) rather than new product development (251). In terms of the number 
of patents filed as outcomes of new product development, firms cooperating with 
universities or GRIs tend to generate more patents than non-cooperating firms: 4.54 vs. 
1.29 in industry-university cooperation comparison, and 4.62 vs. 1.35 in industry-GRI 
cooperation comparison. The difference measured by t-statistics is significant with 2.23 
(p=0.03) for cooperation with university and 2.11 (p=0.04) for cooperation with GRIs 
(table 4B).  
However, in spite of a larger number of firms engaged in process innovation than 
product innovation, much less number of patents are generated by both cooperating and 
non-cooperation firms. It might make sense when we consider the different nature of 
process innovation compared to product innovation. Also, no significant difference is 
found between the cooperating and non-cooperating firms. 
The above simple comparison seems consistent with the fourth hypothesis that IUG 
cooperation contributes more to product rather than process innovation. We will verify 
this by regressions below. 
 
 
<Table 4A> IUG cooperation and firm performance 
Universities GRIs  
Cooperators Non-
cooperators 
t-test Cooperators Non-
cooperators 
t-test 
Patent (no,) 7.22 5.31 0.67 (0.50) 10.36 3.91 1.68 (0.10) 
Sale (%) 48.62 44..90 1.08 (0.28) 49.38 44.70 1.28 (0.20) 
Labor 
productivity 
(trillion won) 
71,234.68 70,394.18 0.12 (0.90) 66,113.04 72,811.18 -0.97 
(0.33) 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis present p-value.  
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
<Table 4B> IUG cooperation and firm performance (no. of patents filed) 
Universities GRIs  
Cooperators Non-
cooperators 
t-test Cooperators Non-
cooperators 
t-test 
New product 
innovation 
4.54 1.29 2.23 
(0.03)** 
4.62 1.35 2.11 
(0.04)** 
Product 
improving 
Innovation 
 
2.12 
  
2.77 
 
-0.41 (0.68) 
 
3.77 
 
1.99 
 
1.11 (0.27) 
Process 
innovation 
0.65 1.26 -0.59 (0.56)
  
2.09 0.58 1.01 (0.32) 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis present p-value.  
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
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3. Regression Methodology 
  
This section sets up empirical models for analysis. First, we analyze what 
determines a firm’s propensity of IUG cooperation, using the Probit model. 
                                  
IUGi = α0 + α1 Xi + u   (1) 
 
X = {SIZE, RD_INT, COST, RISK, GROUP (CAHEBOL10/CAHEBOL11-30), 
regional dummies (r_) IN_IPR, G_SUP} 
 
IUG indicates whether a firm cooperates with university and GRI, respectively: 1 if 
the firm cooperates with them and 0 otherwise. The model is specified by firm size 
(SIZE), R&D intensity (RD_INT), cooperation objective (COST and RISK), affiliation to 
business groups (GROUP), firm location (r_), IPR regime (IN_IPR), and government’s 
support measure (G_SUP). It also includes the top 10 chaebols (CHAEBOL10) and the 
top 11-30 chaebols (CHAEBOL11-30) as a variable of affiliation to business groups. Here, 
marginal effects are estimated at the mean point.  
Second, we test whether IUG cooperation affects the innovation probability of firms, 
using the Probit model. 
 
IUGi = β0 + β1Zi + β2Xi + u1   (2-1) 
P_INNOi = γ0 + γ1IUGi^ + γ2Xi + u2   (2-2) 
 
Z = {regional dummies (r_)}  
X = {SIZE, RD_INT, COST, RISK, GROUP, G_SUP,  
Demand-pull, Cost-push, AGE, EXPORT, FOREIGN, industry dummies} 
 
The innovation probability of firms is estimated by the eq. 2-2. P_INNO is 1 if a 
firm does technological innovation and 0 otherwise. The model is specified by the 
estimated IUG^, instead of IUG, and explanatory variables, X. 
Previous studies deal with this issue without considering the endogeneity of IUG 
cooperation measure. In contrast, bearing in mind that certain factors specific to IUG 
cooperation, e.g. technological capability of firms, indirectly affect firm performance, 
we try to control this endogeneity. If IUG is used instead of IUG^, this variable may be 
correlated with disturbance u2, and thus it is endogenous. The zero-covariance 
condition Cov[Xi, u2] = 0 is violated, and thereby, the zero-conditional-mean 
assumption E[u2| Xi] = 0 does not hold anymore (Baum, 2006). As a result, OLS 
estimates become biased and inconsistent. Accordingly, we control the endogeneity by 
trying an instrument variable for IUG that is uncorrelated with u2 but is highly 
correlated with IUG. We use regional dummies (r_) as instruments; IUG cooperation is 
active in the regions that universities and firms tend to cluster, e.g., Seoul or Daejon, but 
the firms there do not necessarily perform better than otherwise. 
In the first stage, we regress IUG cooperation (IUG) on instrumental variables (Z) 
and exogenous variables (X) (eq. 2-1). In the second stage, we then regress the 
innovation probability of Korean firms (P_INNO) on the estimated or endogenous 
variable (IUG^) and exogenous variable (X) (eq. 2-2). The explanatory variables in eq. 2-
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2 include those of eq.1, except for region dummies, and additional variables—
innovation objectives (Demand-pull and Cost-push), firm age (AGE), export (EXPORT), 
and foreign capital (FOREIGN). In order to control industry effect, industry dummies are 
used instead of IN_IPR, the sector variable in eq. 1.  
Innovation objective is based on the answers to the following question in the survey: 
“What are the objectives of your firm to do technological innovation (on a five-point 
scale)?” Demand-Pull is measured as the average degree of importance of such answers 
as product substitutions, market share increases and improvements in quality, and Cost-
Push, as the average degree of importance of such factors as enhanced flexibility, 
material costs reductions, and labor cost reductions. AGE is measured as a log value of 
firm age. The export of a firm, EXPORT, is measured as a dummy variable, 1 if the firm 
exports in either 2000 or 2001 and 0 otherwise. Foreign capital, FOREIGN, is measured 
as the average ratio of foreign capitals to total capitals, and indicates the share of foreign 
ownership of a company. 
   Third, we analyze how IUG cooperation affects firm performance, with a sample 
selection model. 
 
P_INNOi = δ0 + δ1IUGi + δ2Xi + u1   (3-1) 
INNOi = ε0 + ε1IUGi + ε2Xi + u2   (3-2) 
 
X = {SIZE, RD_INT, GROUP, Demand-Pull, Cost-Push, AGE, EXPORT, FOREIGN,  
industry dummies} 
 
Firm performance (INNO) is estimated by the eq. 3-2. For INNO, three types of 
variables are used, namely, the number of patents filed from each type of innovation, the 
percentage in sales of innovative outcomes produced from product innovation and the 
value added per worker. The model is specified by IUG and explanatory variables, X. 
Additionally, another industry dummies are considered here - high, medium-high, 
medium-low, and low-technology, following the OECD classification (OECD, 2006) 
based on the levels of R&D intensity. 
This analysis deals with only innovative firms. In the KIS, only firms that do 
technological innovation are asked questions regarding how many patents or sales they 
make from each type of innovation. This means that performance variables, INNO, are 
censored based on whether they do technological innovation or not. Accordingly, a 
selection bias based on the unobserved characteristics of firms with the potential of 
doing technological innovation needs to be checked, and if any, it should be corrected. 
If OLS is applied without considering this sample selection bias, this selectivity may 
make the coefficients biased because the sample of firms is not a random one. In order 
to deal with this problem, we use Heckman’s 2SLS (1979), a two-step sample selection 
procedure. In the first stage, the corrective term, the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMILLS), is 
estimated as a prediction of the Probit model (eq. 3-1). Using these estimates, the inverse 
Miller’s ratio is calculated as a function of the standard normal density divided by the 
cumulative distribution function. The ratio is then used as an additional regressor in the 
second stage, using the OLS, to correct the sample selection bias, if any (equation 3-2). 
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IV. Results and Interpretations 
 
1. The Determinants of IUG Cooperation 
 
This part analyzes the determinants of IUG cooperation, using the Probit model. The 
dependent variable measures whether a firm cooperates with universities or GRIs, 
respectively, for its innovation effort: the variable is 1 if it does and 0 otherwise. 
<Table 5> presents the results for both industry-university and industry-GRI 
cooperation. Across two different channels of linkages, one robust and striking result is 
that traditional firm characteristics variables of SIZE and R&D intensity (RD_INT) are 
not statistically significant at all, while the government support variable (G_SUP) is 
significant in both cooperation modes. This is in quite contrast to the results from the 
cases of European countries, and reflects importantly the heavy weight of government 
policies in promoting the IUG cooperation in late-comer economies. 
Another common result across two cooperation modes is the results with dummies 
for business groups or affiliates. First, the coefficient of GROUP (affiliates to either local 
or foreign groups) is negative, but not statistically significant (Model 1). When we 
narrowly focus on local business groups or Chaebols, the results change. The coefficient 
of middle-sized chaebols (CHAEBOL11-30) is significantly negative (Model 3), while 
that of large-sized chaebols (CHAEBOL10) is insignificantly positive (Model 2). This 
implies that middle-sized local business groups tend not to cooperate with universities 
or GRIs, while this might not be the case with large-sized business groups. Our original 
interest is to find out whether firms affiliated to business groups are less inclined to seek 
cooperation with external partners as they might find such partners within the group 
(internal market than external markets) as mentioned in the literature mentions (Mohnen and 
Hoareau, 2003; Capron and Cincera, 2003). Our results show that this might be the case as 
shown by negative sign of the GROUP dummy, and that the case should be stronger 
with regard to middle-sized business groups as shown by significantly negative sign of 
the top 11 to 30 chaebols.  
Now let us turn to some differences between the two cooperation modes. First, we 
notice that cost-sharing motives are more important and significant for linkages with 
universities, whereas risk-sharing motives, for linkages with GRIs. This might reflect 
the situation in Korea that GRIs in general have more financial resources than 
universities with more direct and regular support from the government budget. In 
contrast, firms seem to cooperate with universities to get help from knowledge of 
professors and student and thereby save the cost of man power. 
Another difference between the two modes is found with regard to the importance of 
IPR regimes with this sector variable (IN_IPR) significant and positive only for the 
university-cooperation mode. This results are consistent with the literature, like 
(Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005), suggesting that firms consider the IPR issue seriously 
when they cooperate with universities. This might have to do with the fact that 
cooperation with universities are often carried out with money from the firm side, 
whereas cooperation with GRIs are often led financially by GRIs. 
Finally, firm location variable or regional dummies are in general significant, 
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although different locations are shown to be strong either of the two modes. The two 
regions containing two largest cities in Korea, namely The Seoul metropolitan area 
(r_S) and Busan city (r_KN) are shown to be strong in both modes as expected, in 
addition to the South Chungcheong and Daejon area with the famous Daejon science 
park (r_CN). 
 
<Table 5> Determinants of IUG cooperation (Probit model) 
Industry-university cooperation Industry-GRI cooperation   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
SIZE 0.06 (1.01) 
0.03 
(0.52) 
0.08 
(1.21) 
0.08 
(1.19) 
0.05 
(0.79) 
0.08 
(1.27) 
RD_INT 0.66 (1.13) 
0.68 
(1.15) 
0.68 
(1.17) 
0.81 
(1.32) 
0.84 
(1.37) 
0.84 
(1.37) 
GROUP -0.23 (-1.17)     
-0.31 
(-1.52)     
CHAEBOL10   0.26 (0.68)     
0.08 
(0.19)   
CHAEBOL11-30     -0.93 (-2.02)**     
-0.84 
(-1.79)* 
COST 0.11 (1.68)* 
0.11 
(1.68)* 
0.12 
(1.71)* 
0.10 
(1.45) 
0.10 
(1.46) 
0.10 
(1.49) 
RISK 0.10 (1.46) 
0.10 
(1.48) 
0.10 
(1.49) 
0.12 
(1.83)* 
0.12 
(1.79)* 
0.12 
(1.83)* 
r_S 0.98 (1.84)* 
1.05 
(1.95)* 
1.02 
(1.92)* 
1.03 
(1.86)* 
1.07 
(1.93)* 
1.07 
(1.96)* 
r_CB 1.00 (1.65) 
1.04 
(1.70)* 
1.04 
(1.72)* 
0.75 
(1.18) 
0.75 
(1.17) 
0.77 
(1.22) 
r_CN 1.32 (2.29)** 
1.36 
(2.33)** 
1.31 
(2.28)** 
1.32 
(2.20)** 
1.32 
(2.20)** 
1.30 
(2.19)** 
r_JB   1.66 (2.53)** 
1.72 
(2.59)** 
1.72 
(2.61)** 
1.10 
(1.55) 
1.12 
(1.57) 
1.13 
(1.60) 
r_KB  1.07 (1.88)* 
1.13 
(1.97)* 
1.08 
(1.92)* 
0.92 
(1.56) 
0.96 
(1.62) 
0.94 
(1.61) 
r_KN  1.25 (2.26)** 
1.31 
(2.35)** 
1.28 
(2.34)** 
1.05 
(1.84)* 
1.08 
(1.89)* 
1.09 
(1.93)* 
G_SUP 0.62 (4.54)*** 
0.62 
(4.57)*** 
0.62 
(4.57)* 
0.80 
(5.68)*** 
0.81 
(5.76)** 
0.81 
(5.74)*** 
IN_IPR 0.33 (1.86)* 
0.31 
(1.73)* 
0.35 
(1.93)* 
0.16 
(0.87) 
0.13 
(0.73) 
0.16 
(0.88) 
       
No. of obs 538 538 538 538 538 538 
McFadden R^2 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.19 
Log likelihood -260.29 -260.77 -258.64 -241.15 -243.32 -240.5 
Pro(LR stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: 1) Variables starting with r’s are regional dummies: r_S (Seoul Metropolitan area), r_CB (North 
Choongchung province), r_CN (South Choongchung province), r_JB (North Junra province), r_KB 
(North Kyungsnag province) and r_KN (South Kyungsang province).  
2) Numbers in parentheses indicate z-values. 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
      
 
Next, we estimate the marginal effects of the determinants at the mean point (Table 
6). The marginal effect of an additional point in the participation at the government- 
supported R&D program is to increase the firms’ probability of cooperating with 
university by 19.0% and with GRI by 23.0%, respectively. An additional point in the 
effectiveness of the IPR regime significantly increases the firms’ propensity for 
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cooperation with the former by 10.0%. Moreover, an additional point in the importance 
of cost-sharing objective increases the firms’ likelihood by 3.0%. Regarding 
cooperation with GRI, an additional point in the importance of risk-sharing objective 
increases the firms’ likelihood by 3.0%. 
 
<Table 6> Marginal effects 
  Industry-university cooperation Industry-GRI cooperation 
SIZE   0.02(1.01)  0.02(1.19) 
RD_INT     0.19(1.13)  0.22(1.32) 
GROUP -0.06(-1.27)  -0.07(-1.49) 
COST 0.03(1.68)* 0.03(1.45) 
RISK 0.02(1.47) 0.03(1.85)* 
r_S 0.27(2.02)** 0.26(2.04)** 
R_CB 0.36(1.55) 0.25(1.03) 
R_CN  0.48(2.36)** 0.47(2.15)** 
R_JB   0.59(3.20)** 0.39(1.43) 
R_KB  0.38(1.78)*  0.31(1.39) 
R_KN  0.44(2.21)** 0.35(1.67)* 
G_SUP 0.19(4.42)***  0.23(5.47)*** 
IN_IPR  0.10(1.87)* 0.04(0.87) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate z-values. 
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 
2. The Impacts of IUG Cooperation on Firm Performance 
 
(1) Innovation Probability 
 
This part analyzes the impact of IUG cooperation on the innovation probability of 
firms, using the Probit model. The dependent variable measures whether a firm does 
(and succeeds in) technological innovation: the value of this variable is 1 if it does and 0 
otherwise. IUG cooperation variable, IUG, is measured as 1 if a firm cooperates with 
university, and GRI, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Different from the previous studies, 
this analysis controls the endogeneity. <Table A1> reveals the regression result of the 1st 
stage, IUG^ (eq. 2-1). The coefficients of the regional dummies are statistically 
significant, revealing the strong relevance of the instruments. Then, IUG^, instead of 
IUG, is used at the 2nd stage (eq. 2-2) to see its impact. Both results are presented in 
<Table 7>.   
IUG reveals a significantly positive sign (2nd and 3rd columns), implying a significant 
impact of the IUG cooperation on innovation possibility. But, this result change when 
endogeneity is controlled, using IUG^: the coefficient of the latter is not statistically 
significant (4th and 5th columns). Based on the result, we can say that the significance of 
IUG in the first step reflects the endogeneity such that more innovative firms tend to 
pursue collaboration with universities or GRIs, not the other way around. This is 
different from previous studies in advanced countries (Monjon and Waelbroeck, 2003): the 
latter reports the positive impact, without controlling the endogeneity of IUG 
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cooperation measure. 
Regarding the other variables, the variable of the government support (G_SUP) 
indicating participation at the national R&D programs is shown to be positive and 
significant, which again underscores the importance of the government initiatives to 
promote innovation in private firms. Besides this, the demand-pull and cost-push factors 
are shown to be statistically significant, which implies that firms tend to innovate either 
to increase market shares and improve product quality (demand pull) or to reduce the 
costs of material or labor inputs (cost-push). EXPORT is also statistically positive, 
implying that export-oriented firms tend to do technological innovation. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the impact of R&D intensity (RD_INT) is shown to be obscure. This result 
may be related to the possibility that due to contemporaneous nature of regressions now 
allowing for lagged impacts the impact of today’s R&D might not show up affecting 
today’s innovation success possibility.  
 
<Table 7> Impact of IUG cooperation on the innovation probability  
Probit model 
  Probit model 
(endogeneity controlled) 
Industry-university 
cooperation 
Industry-GRI 
cooperation 
Industry-university 
cooperation 
Industry-GRI 
cooperation  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
SIZE 0.03(0.28) 0.04(0.35) 0.04(0.40) 0.04(0.39) 
RD_INT -1.56(-2.37)** -1.61(-2.36)** -1.05(-1.63) -1.03(-1.76)* 
GROUP 0.00(0.02) 0.01 (0.03) -0.10(-0.36) -0.15(-0.52) 
COST 0.12(1.24) 0.11(1.21) 0.17(1.51) 0.11(1.30) 
RISK 0.08(0.83) 0.08(0.82) 0.10(1.20) 0.11(1.37) 
G_SUP 0.21(1.05) 0.19(0.95) 0.61(2.19)** 0.62(2.08)** 
Demand-Pull 0.42(4.85)*** 0.42(4.83)*** 0.42(5.02)*** 0.42(5.05)*** 
Cost-Push 0.17(2.11)** 0.17(2.13)** 0.25(2.88)** 0.22(2.65)** 
AGE -0.01(-0.11) -0.01(-0.17) 0.00(0.01) 0.01(0.05) 
EXPORT 0.23(1.18) 0.21(1.07) 0.41(1.87)* 0.43(1.86)* 
FOREIGN 0.55(1.10) 0.51(1.03) 0.19(0.46) 0.39(0.97) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
IUG 0.51(2.19)** 0.58(2.24)**   
IUG^   -1.69(-1.65) -1.40(-1.40) 
     
No. of obs 538 538 538 538 
Pseudo R^2 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57 
Log likelihood -140.63 -140.43 -135.02 -135.33 
Pro(LR stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate z-values 
            ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively.  
 
Based on this result, regarding the hypothesis two, we conclude that the IUG 
cooperation does not seem to be the triggering factor for the probability of innovation 
success. Rather, successful innovation seems to be affected by direct government 
support program, as well as traditional factors like cost-push and demand-pull factors.  
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(2) Sale vs. Patent and Product Innovation vs. Process Innovation 
 
Now in this part, we deal with only the innovative firms, and analyze the impact of 
their IUG cooperation on firm performance. For this reason, we do not have to worry 
about the possible endogeneity of IUG cooperation but should be instead concerned 
about the possible sample selection bias as discussed above. Thus, using the Heckman’s 
2SLS, we checks the data for sample selection bias associated with firms’ innovation 
propensity. As seen from the following results, IMILLS, the inverse Miller’s ratio, is 
statistically significant in some cases, proving the existence of sample selection bias. 
The bias is corrected then by adding this term, IMILLS. For dependent variables, three 
alternatives are tried: the number of patents filed from innovation, share of sales 
associated with product innovation, and labor productivity. 
Table 8A and 8B present the results examining the impact of the IUG cooperation on 
different indicators of firm performance. The coefficient of IUG is not statistically 
significant at all for all the three indicators of the number of patents, sale, and labor 
productivity, either in the industry-university case or in industry-GRI cooperation case. 
This implies that this cooperation has no significant impact on firm performance overall, 
which is consistent with the preceding results on the impact of the IUG cooperation on 
innovation probability. The result is different from the case of advanced countries where 
industry-university cooperation contributes to the sales of innovation outcomes as well 
as the number of patents filed. 
 
<Table 8A> Impact of industry-university cooperation on firm performance (OLS with selection bias checks) 
    Model 1     Model 2   
  Patent  Sale  Labor productivity Patent  Sale  
Labor 
productivity 
SIZE 0.10(4.88)*** 0.01(0.44) 0.01(1.28) 0.11(6.76)*** 0.01(0.48) 0.01(0.11) 
RD_INT 0.25(0.85) 0.35(1.06) -0.08(-1.28) 0.22(1.00) 0.57(2.24)** -0.09(-1.51) 
GROUP -0.05(-0.84) -0.12(-1.75)* 0.03(2.10)** -0.05(-1.13) -0.08(-1.51) 0.03(2.21)** 
Demand-Pull 0.08(1.50) 0.10(1.50) 0.01(0.61) 0.06(1.55) 0.02(0.84) 0.01(0.64) 
Cost-Push 0.00(0.18) 0.08(3.39)*** 0.01(2.22)** -0.00(-0.12) 0.07(3.87)*** 0.01(2.13)** 
AGE -0.06(-2.29)** -0.06(-2.14)** 0.01(0.84) -0.06(-2.80)** -0.04(-1.77)* 0.00(0.61) 
EXPORT 0.05(1.02) 0.03(0.53) 0.01(0.81) 0.04(1.09) -0.01(-0.23) 0.01(1.08) 
FOREIGN -0.05(-0.43) -0.08(-0.67) 0.04(1.50)** -0.04(-0.44) -0.02(-0.23) 0.03(1.39)* 
IUG(UNIV) 0.05(0.90) 0.07(1.10) 0.01(1.17) 0.04(0.99) 0.01(0.16) 0.01(0.94) 
OECD 
industry 
dummies 
Included Included Included      
Industry 
dummies       Included Included Included  
IMILLS 0.40(1.85)* 0.40(1.70)* 0.13(2.44)** 0.29(1.99)**   0.12(2.69)** 
       
No. of obs 382 330 310 382 330 310 
R^2 0.15 0.12 0.20 0.24 0.17 0.29 
Adjusted R^2 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.19 0.12 0.25 
 Prob(F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate t-values 
          ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
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<Table 8B> Impact of industry-GRI cooperation on firm performance (OLS with selection bias checks) 
    Model 1     Model 2   
  Patent  Sale  Labor productivity Patent  Sale  
Labor 
productivity 
SIZE 0.10(7.44)*** 0.01(0.46) 0.01(1.41) 0.11(7.48)*** 0.01(0.47) 0.01(1.23) 
RD_INT 0.40(1.92)* 0.40(1.42) -0.07(-1.11) 0.36(1.72)* 0.56(2.18)** -0.08(-1.28) 
GROUP -0.05(-1.36) -0.11(-1.93)* 0.03(2.21)** -0.05(-1.35) -0.08(-1.49) 0.03(2.30)** 
Demand-Pull 0.00(0.04) 0.08(1.54) 0.01(0.49) -0.00(-0.01) 0.02(0.84) 0.01(0.54) 
Cost-Push -0.02(-1.39) 0.08(3.91)*** 0.01(2.27)** -0.02(-1.32) 0.07(3.86)*** 0.01(2.18)** 
AGE -0.06(-3.27)** -0.06(-2.45)** 0.01(0.99) -0.06(-3.13)*** -0.04(-1.78)* 0.00(0.71) 
EXPORT 0.02(0.49) 0.02(0.48) 0.01(0.84) 0.01(0.34) -0.01(-0.26) 0.01(1.16) 
FOREIGN -0.07(-1.01) -0.08(-0.82) 0.03(1.54)** -0.07(-0.95) -0.02(-0.24) 0.03(1.40) 
IUG(GRI) 0.04(1.34) 0.07(1.15) 0.01(0.71) 0.04(1.52) 0.01(0.37) 0.00(0.29) 
OECD 
industry 
dummies 
Included Included Included        
Industry 
dummies      Included Included Included 
IMILLS   0.33(1.72)* 0.03(2.21)**     0.11(2.66)*** 
       
No. of obs 382 330 310 382 330 310 
R^2 0.16 0.12 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.29 
Adjusted R^2 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.25 
 Prob(F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate t-values 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 
Next, in results in presented in tables 9A and 9B, we have divided the patents into 
types of the associated innovations, namely patents filed as outcomes of new product 
development, product improvement, and process innovation. Now it is confirmed that 
the IUG cooperation affects positively the number of patents filed not from process 
innovation but from product innovation to develop new products but not to improve 
existing products. The correlation is more robust in the industry-university cooperation 
than in the industry-GRI cooperation. This result is consistent with the finding by 
Rouvinen (2002) that in the Finnish manufacturing firms the industry-university 
research cooperation contribute only to product innovation, while industry-client or 
supplier contributes to process innovation as well. This result is also consistent with the 
finding by Belderbos et al (2004) that university is important source of knowledge for 
radical innovation. 
It is also interesting to note that now the R&D intensity (RD_INT) turns out to be 
significant for patents filed from new product and process innovation, whereas it was 
not significant in the regressions on innovation probability in the whole sample 
regressions. This R&D intensity variable is also significant for the sales associated with 
innovation in regressions with industry dummies. These results together implies that 
while more R&D intensity cannot guarantee the success of innovation effort but it is 
positively associated with certain types of patents or sales when there is successful 
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innovations. 
Among other variables, the SIZE variable is significantly positive for patents, 
suggesting that larger firms tend to be more innovative than smaller ones. This is 
consistent with Schumpeter’s original observation on the role of big firms (Schumpeter, 
1949; Kamien and Schwartz, 1975). Besides, older firms (AGE variable) are shown to perform 
worse than younger ones, in terms of both patents and sales. 
Another interesting finding is about the FOREIGN (foreign ownership) variable. The 
insignificance of this variable in innovation probability first implies that foreign-
ownership does not guarantee innovation success. Then, the insignificance of this 
variable in innovation performance equation with sales or patents but high significance 
in labor productivity equation implies that any superior performance of foreign firms 
tend not to come from their innovation efforts in the host country (Korea) but from 
higher productivity possibly associated with knowledge and skills transplanted directly 
from abroad. In contrast to the foreign ownership variable, export-orientation variable is 
shown to be positively linked not only to innovation probability but also to the IUG 
cooperation possibility.  
In sum, the results with regard to R&D intensity, size and age are not surprising and 
consistent with the literature. An interesting finding from this study should be the 
limited impact of the IUG cooperation, showing up only in the form of more patents 
related to new product development. This feature deserves more discussion. 
 
<Table 9A> Impact of industry-university cooperation on patents by innovation-types 
    Model 1     Model 2   
  New product innovation 
Product 
improvement 
Process 
innovation  
New product 
innovation 
Product 
improvement 
Process 
innovation  
SIZE 0.05(6.06)*** 0.06(7.15)*** 0.02(2.50)** 0.05(5.76)*** 0.07(7.27)*** 0.02(2.51)** 
RD_INT 0.28(1.83)* 0.15(1.09) 0.38(2.39)** 0.31(1.91)* 0.12(0.90) 0.36(2.23)** 
GROUP -0.04(-1.78)* -0.04(-1.56) -0.00(-0.00) -0.04(-1.59) -0.04(-1.69)* 0.00(0.04) 
Demand-Pull 0.01(0.53) -0.01(-0.49) -0.01(-0.86) 0.01(0.76) -0.01(-0.62) -0.01(-0.86) 
Cost-Push -0.00(-0.28) -0.01(-0.62) -0.02(-2.25)** -0.00(-0.27) -0.01(-0.58) -0.02(-2.28)** 
AGE -0.02(-1.79)* -0.05(-4.11)*** -0.00(-0.14) -0.02(-1.85)* -0.05(-4.10)*** -0.00(-0.03) 
EXPORT -0.00(-0.23) 0.02(0.82) 0.02(0.67) -0.00(-0.18) 0.01(0.59) 0.01(0.56) 
FOREIGN -0.00(-0.12) -0.05(-1.03) -0.04(-1.12) -0.01(-0.17) -0.05(-0.99) -0.04(-1.05) 
IUG(UNIV) 0.03(2.03)** -0.02(-1.06) -0.02(-0.93) 0.03(1.91)* -0.02(-1.13) -0.01(-0.87) 
OECD 
industry 
dummies 
Included Included Included       
Industry 
dummies       Included Included Included 
       
No. of obs 266 322 246 266 322 246 
R^2 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.09 
Adjusted R^2 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.02 
 Prob(F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.23  
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate t-values 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
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<Table 9B> Impact of industry-GRI cooperation on patents by innovation types 
    Model 1     Model 2   
  New product innovation 
Product 
improvement 
Process 
innovation  
New product 
innovation 
Product 
improvement 
Process 
innovation  
SIZE 0.05(5.98)*** 0.06(7.07)*** 0.02(2.42)** 0.05(5.71)*** 0.06(7.19)*** 0.02(2.49)** 
RD_INT 0.28(1.76)* 0.13(0.96) 0.34(2.13)** 0.30(1.85)* 0.10(0.73) 0.31(1.89)* 
GROUP -0.04(-1.73)* -0.04(-1.54) 0.00(0.09) -0.04(-1.58) -0.04(-1.65) 0.00(0.13) 
Demand-Pull 0.00(0.42) -0.01(-0.41) -0.01(-0.87) 0.01(0.64) -0.01(-0.52) -0.01(-0.89) 
Cost-Push -0.00(-0.15) -0.01(-0.74) -0.02(-2.38)** -0.00(-0.13) -0.01(-0.72) -0.02(-2.37)** 
AGE -0.02(-1.77)* -0.05(-4.13)*** -0.00(-0.20) -0.02(-1.85)* 
-0.05(-
4.10)*** -0.00(-0.05) 
EXPORT -0.01(-0.26) 0.01(0.68) 0.01(0.52) -0.00(-0.18) 0.01(0.40) 0.01(0.33) 
FOREIGN -0.01(-0.27) -0.04(-0.93) -0.04(-1.04) -0.01(-0.30) -0.04(-0.86) -0.04(-0.92) 
IUG(GRI) 0.02(1.68)* 0.00(0.27) 0.01(0.85) 0.02(1.45) 0.01(0.45) 0.02(1.11) 
OECD 
industry 
dummies 
Included Included Included       
Industry 
dummies       Included Included Included 
       
No. of obs 266 322 246 266 322 246 
R^2 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.1 
Adjusted R^2 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.02 
 Prob(F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.21  
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate t-values 
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 
This pattern seems to reflect the level of development in knowledge industrialization 
in Korea. Knowledge industrialization goes through several stages. It starts from R&D 
effort, and then effort can lead to some R&D outcomes captured in either patents and 
other IPR forms or tacit knowledge. These new knowledge can then be commercially 
and practically utilized to lead to increase in sale or productivity. As this scheme 
indicates, patent generation correspond to prior stage to the stage of actual utilization. In 
this light, our results indicate the Korean practices have just reached the stage before 
actual industrialization. A caution is needed in this interpretation because patents in the 
current are possible to lead to the increase of sale or productivity in the next period. 
This study cannot capture this time-lag effect due to data limitation, that is, cross-
sectional data. However, we would like put emphasis on the former interpretation 
because it is more consistent with reality in Korea where the policy agenda has only 
recently been shifted from generation of more patents to their industrialization (Lim 
2006). So far, the number of patents generated from the national R&D projects has been 
one of the most important and easy to impose criteria from the point of view of 
bureaucrats. 
Next, producing more patents related to product innovation than from process 
innovation also require two interpretations. It might first indicate the nature of the IUG 
cooperation such that it target not just technical consultation or short-term projects but 
more radical or basic R&D goals, as noted in the Korean literature mentions (SERI, 
2006; Park et al., 2000). In the past, university and GRI may have contributed more to 
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process innovation, as firms themselves are pre-occupied with reverse engineering or 
problem-solving type minor innovations. However, now the level of technological 
capability of the Korean has been upgraded to a certain extent, and they feel more need 
in R&D collaboration to generate product innovation. Second, this result also seems to 
reflect to a certain degree the fact that outcomes of process innovation tends to be less 
readily protected via patents; rather, it is often exploited internally or it constitutes a part 
of product innovation (Rouvinen, 2002). Thus our position is not to say that the 
successful IUG cooperation does not take the form of process innovation but only to say 
that it tend to show up more in product innovation and related patents. 
 
V. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
  
Given the increasing importance of knowledge and universities as the source of new 
knowledge, this paper has investigated the role of firms’ cooperation with universities 
and GRIs in the NIS of an emerging economy of Korea. As a fast catching-up economy, 
the NIS of Korea has been unbalanced or immature with strong dominance by the 
government and a few big firms called Chaebols and the accompanied weaker roles by 
universities and the SMEs. These unique characteristics of the Korea NIS have left its 
knowledge industrialization systems underdeveloped, compared to those in the 
advanced countries. It is only recently or since mid 1990s that Korea has realized the 
significance of knowledge industrialization and started to promote it again by the 
government initiatives. Thus, the focus of the paper has been on sorting out the 
differences of Korea as a late-comer from the situation in more mature and advanced 
economies.  
This utilizes the 2001/02 Korea Innovation Survey data to find out the determinants 
of industry-university and industry-GRI (IUG) cooperation and its impact on firm 
performance. Regarding the latter, it has focused on innovation probability and on sale 
vs. patent (by the type of performance) and product innovation vs. process innovation (by 
the type of innovation). The main findings are as follows. 
First, among determinants of IUG cooperation, traditional firm characteristics 
variables of sizes and R&D intensity are not significant at all, while the participation at 
the national R&D project turns out be most significant and robust in both cooperation 
modes. This is in quite contrast to the results from the cases of European countries, and 
reflects importantly the heavy weight of government policies in promoting the IUG 
cooperation in late-comer economies. As difference between the two modes of 
cooperation, we find that cost-sharing motives are more important for the industry-
university mode, whereas risk-sharing motives, for the industry-GRI mode. The 
importance of IPR regimes is shown more clearly in the industry-university cooperation 
mode. 
Second, regarding the impacts of the IUG cooperation, we strikingly find no 
significant impact on the innovation probability of firms when we control the possible 
endogeneity such that already innovative firms might participate more at such 
cooperation modes. This implies that the IUG cooperation cannot guarantee a firm 
success in technological innovation; rather, it may have an influence on the selection or 
direction of the firm’s research projects.  
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When we limit the analysis to the innovative firms, we do find positive impacts of 
the IUG cooperation on patents generated from new product innovation but no impacts 
in terms of sales increase or labor productivity. This is again quite different from the 
results from the advanced countries. These results seem to reflect the still transitional 
nature of the NIS and knowledge industrialization such that knowledge industrialization 
(innovation leading to sales or productivity) has not been fully progressed, and also reflect 
the nature of government-sponsored IUG program where the number of generated 
patents was given high priority as evaluation criteria. Also, significant increase of 
patents from new product innovation rather than product-improving or process 
innovation seems to reflect the characteristics of the research by Korean universities as 
being oriented toward more radical innovation.  
It is also interesting to note that the R&D intensity is positively related to the 
number of patents and sales associated with new product and process innovation, 
whereas it was not significant in the regressions on innovation probability or as 
determinants of the IUG cooperation. These results together implies that while more 
R&D intensity cannot guarantee the success of innovation effort but it is positively 
associated with certain types of patents or sales when there is successful innovations. 
Synthesizing the above findings, an emerging picture about the nature of the IUG 
cooperation in Korea is as follows: Given the low priority of universities or GRIs as the 
partners for innovation efforts (lower than those of client or supplier firms), some firms are 
exposed to the opportunity to cooperate with them more when they participate at the 
national R&D projects. But, this cooperation arrangement does not increase the 
probability of innovation success, while the participation at the national R&D itself 
counts significantly as a determinant of the cooperation. Then, in the cases of successful 
innovations, the cooperation with universities or GRIs tend to be associated more with 
product innovation, than process innovation, that generate patents rather than new sales. 
This story is consistent with observation in the literature (George et al., 2002; Mowery and 
Sampat, 2005) that due to their characteristics of knowledge or way of knowledge 
transfer, industry-university cooperation may not directly influence the firms’ success in 
innovation; rather, it can affect their decision-making or management of research 
projects. 
Contribution of the paper lies in that it adopts more rigorous method to show the 
different motivations and impacts of the IUG cooperation between a late-comer 
economy and the advanced countries, and interprets them in terms of the different stages 
of development in knowledge industrialization systems. One limitation of this study is 
that it refers to only the particular point of time of 2001 and 2002 whereas the 
knowledge industrialization in Korea is in constant change, with more roles played by 
universities and diverse evaluation criteria being adopted.6 It should be thus interesting 
to try with newer data set to see if there is any sign of improvement or maturing. 
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≪ Appendix ≫ 
 
 Figure A1  The structure of firms in the KIS 
 
  
<Table A1> Endogeneity: first stage 
  Industry-university cooperation 
Industry-GRI 
cooperation 
SIZE 0.01(0.09) -0.00(-0.05) 
RD_INT 0.92(1.49) 1.27(1.96)** 
GROUP -0.15(-0.73) -0.28(-1.27) 
COST 0.05(0.73) 0.02(0.27) 
RISK 0.05(0.74) 0.11(1.46) 
G_SUP 0.55(3.91)*** 0.76(5.12)** 
Demand-Pull 0.10(1.17) 0.14(1.6) 
Cost-Push 0.13(1.83)* 0.12(1.62) 
AGE 0.02(0.22) 0.01(0.08) 
EXPORT 0.40(2.20)** 0.59(2.94)*** 
FOREIGN -0.78(-1.83)* -0.30(-0.73) 
r_S 0.98(1.70)* 1.12(1.86)* 
r_CHB 1.01(1.54) 0.90(1.29) 
r_CHN 1.41(2.25)** 1.49(2.25)** 
r_JNB   1.66(2.39)** 1.10(1.45) 
r_KNB  1.08(1.78)* 0.88(1.38) 
r_KNN  1.18(1.99)** 0.99(1.59) 
Industry dummies Included Included 
   
No. of obs 538 538 
Pseudo R^2 0.20 0.25 
Log likelihood -244.73 -220.30 
Pro(LR stat) 0.00 0.00  
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1 For example, Landry et al. (2007), based on a data of 1,554 researchers, find that Canadian researchers 
are more actively involved in non-commercial knowledge transfer rather than commercial one, less 
involved in intellectual property right. 
2 Technological spillovers are often defined as “non-appropriable amounts of knowledge” transmitted 
voluntarily or involuntarily (Monjon and Waelbroeck, 2003). Regarding industry-university 
cooperation, the literature refers to indirect or informal interactions between them: Monjon and 
Waelbroeck (2003) regard publications and discussions at conferences as channels of knowledge 
transmission from universities to industries; Gibbons and Johnston (2000) treat scientific papers and 
contacts with scientists as the most important sources of academic knowledge. 
3 They measure spillover as the degree of the importance of university as a source of information. 
4 They measure spillover as residuals from the auxiliary regression of spillover variables by partner. 
5 This is a standardized manual that provides the criteria on innovation surveys. The Manual was firstly 
published by OECD countries in 1992, based on which several Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
projects were conducted. In Korea, three Surveys have been done for last 10 years. 
6 According to the more recent 2005 KIS that refer to the period of 2002-2004, university (18%) is now 
shown as the most important partner of firms in technological innovation, out of 10 alternatives. The 
second preference was client firms (15%), followed by supplier (14%), competitor (11%), and GRI 
(11%). Even in terms of degree of importance, university receives the highest score. This result partly 
reflects a change in the status of university as compared to that in the 2002 KIS (2000-2001).  
